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THE COURT OV APPEAlS, 1954 TERM
discretion of the executive officer having power to grant some kind of discharge: '
Since the Governor as Commander in Chief had power to discharge, and since the
commanding general was the Governor's subordinate, the Court of Appeals refused
to go back of the document to determine whether or not the Governor in fact
commanded the action. 40
The Appellate Division had relied heavily on People ex Tel. Smith V.
Hoffman,41 which had held that a determination by a military board as to a
National Guard officer's fitness was a judicial finding, subject to civil court review.
The Court of Appeals distinguished the case, on the ground that the State Constitution requires a trial and findings (that is, a judicial process) for removal of
an officer,'4 2 but there is nothing similar in the Constitution or statute as to
enlisted men, and the regulations provide only for a "recommending" board, saying
nothing about hearing or findings. A second ground of distinction was that the
officer's case involved an involuntary separation while this case involved a voluntary
application for discharge, with discretion in the military authorities as to the kind
of a discharge to be granted.
While distinguishing Smith v. Hoffman, the Court of Appeals did support the
rule of law expressed therein. If the board, dealing with the discharge has the
duty not of advising the Governor but of making an adjudication, certiorari will
lie.43 However, if the board is merely "an agency created to advise the governor as
commander in chief," and the Governor can act regardless of the recommendation,
then certiorari will not lie.44 Since the latter part of the rule was found applicable
here, there could be no judicial review of the discharge.
A contrary decision would open the door of the Court to review of all
National Guard discharges. This could become a sizeable undertaking, especially
in the light of new compulsory. military reserve legislation. The case does point
out a need for safeguards for part time soldiers against arbitrary action by the
Guard which will unjustly affect the civilian part of their lives. However, this
would seem to be an administrative problem and not a judicial one.
Husband and Wife As Joint Tenants
In re Polizzo's Estate45 involved an assignment of a bond and mortgage by a
39. Reid v. United States, 161 F. 469, 472 (S. D. N. Y. 1908), appeal dismissed
211 U. S. 529 (1909).
40. The Court concedes that the Governor probably did not actually order
the particular discharge, but nevertheless the power to discharge is the Governor's

power and therefore free from review.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

166 N. Y. 462, 60 N. E. 187 (1901).
N. Y. CoNsT. art. XII, § 6.
166 N. Y. 462 at 471, 60 N. E. 187 at 189.
Id. at 468, 60 N. E. at 188.
308 N. Y. 517, 127 N. E. 2d 316 (1955).
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wife, through an intermediary acting as a conduit only, to her husband and herself
and to the survivor's heirs and assigns. The question was whether the husband
acquired a present joint ownership in the bond and mortgage or only a right of
survivorship.
"Every estate granted or devised to two or more persons in their own right
40
shall be a tenancy in common, unless expressly declared to be joint tenancy."
This applies only in the absence of evidence of a clear intent as
to the type of interest created. 47 The section applies to personal property as
well as real property.48 There is no tenancy by the entirety in personal property. 40
However, when a chose in action, whether a bank account,50 a bond, 1 a bond and
mortgage,52 stock, 53 or other investment in personality was owned originally by
the husband and he assigned it to himself and wife during marriage, or if he
furnished the consideration and arranged to have it made over to himself and his
wife, then a presumption is applied, in the absence of proof of the contrary, that
the husband intended that his wife have a survivorship right only, and not present
ownership of one-half or of any other part. In Moskowitz v. Marrow 4 it was said:
"This rule presents an exception if not an anomaly in the law of property and is
applicable only in the case of a gift by a husband to his wife of property or moneys
belonging solely to himself."55
The Court of Appeals supported the Appellate Division, which had held
that the original assignment by the wife created a joint tenancy, with the husband
and wife each thereafter owning an undivided half interest in the bond and
mortgage, and that the husband's assignment of his half interest was effective to
terminate the joint tenancy, after which the husband's assignee and the wife were
owners in common.
The majority's reasoning was that if the couple had not been husband and
wife at the time of the assignment of the mortgage to them, they would have
46. N. Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW § 66.
47. Overheiser v. Lackey, 207 N. Y. 229, 100 N. E. 738 (1913); McGrane v.
Wiener, 268 App. Div. 789, 49 N. Y. S. 2d 23 (2d Dep't 1944).
48. Matter of Kimberly, 150 N. Y. 90, 44 N. E. 945 (1896); Matter of Blumenthal, 236 N. Y. 448, 141 N. E. 911 (1923).
49. Matter of Albrecht, 136 N. Y. 91, 32 N. E. 632 (1892); Matter of MeKelway's Estate, 221 N. Y. 15, 116 N. E. 348 (1917); Matter of Blumenthal, supra

note 48.
50. West v. McCullough, 123 App. Div. 846, 108 N. Y. Supp. 493 (2d Dep't
1908), aff'd 194 N. Y. 518, 87 N. E. 1130 (1909). Cf. N. Y. BANKING LAW § 239
239(3).
51. Matter of McKelway's Estate, supra note 49.
52. Matter of Albrecht, supra note 49; Belfano v. Belfano, 252 App. Dlv. 453,
300 N. Y. Supp. 319 (3rd Dep't 1937), af'd 278 N. Y. 563, 16 N. E. 2d 103 (1938)
53. Matter of Kane's Estate, 246 N. Y. 498, 159 N. E. 410 (1927).
54. 251 N. Y. 380, 167 N. E. 506 (1929).
55. Id. at 391, 167 N. E. at 514.

THE COURT OF APPEALS, 1954 TERM
become joint tenants with the right of survivorship, and with the further right in
each of them to terminate the joint ownership and create a tenancy in common
by conveying his or her interest to a third party.58 The presumption as to the
husband-to-wife transfer was seen as a vestige of the common law rule that a
husband owned all his wife's personality, and that thus, when he purported to pass
to her an interest in his own personality, he could not have intended to give her
anything greater than a right of survivorship. 57 Since this historical theory is seen
as having no impact on a modern-day transfer, the court refused to extend the
presumption applicable in a husband-to-wife transfer to a wife-to-husband transfer,
in the absence of proof that the actual intent was to establish a right of survivorship
only.
The dissenters would have enlarged the coverage of the presumption, so that
proof of a gift by the wife of property solely belonging to her would make out a
prime facie case of a joint tenancy, with a right of exclusive present enjoyment in
the wife and a right of survivorship in the husband. Fairness was seen as dictating
equal treatment for married women, especially when there was no reason for
establishing a double standard. The historical theory argument was rejected, since
the presumption was seen as based on the lack of consideration.58 If the majority's
decision is merely a step in the removal of the vestigial presumption admittedly an
anomaly in the law of property, then it certainly is justifiable. However, if the
presumption is to be retained in the husband-to-wife transfer, then the majority
can be credited only with the creation of a new source of confusion by applying a
double standard based solely on which spouse transfers the property.
Conflicts-Domestic Relations
Where a contractual transaction has elements in different jurisdictions, the
New York courts have used various approaches to determine which law is to be
applied: that of the jurisdiction where the contract was made; that of the place of
performance; that intended by the parties; or that of the jurisdiction in which are
grouped the significant contacts. 59 The Restatement of Conflict of Laws states
that the law of the place of making should govern the validity of the contract and
56. Matter of Suter's Estate, 258 N. Y. 104, 179 N. E. 310 (1932).
57. West v. McCullough, supra, note 50.
58. 308 N. Y. at 523, 127 N. E. 2d at 320: "Surely an inquiry into who paid the

consideration has not the rights under the slightest relation to married women's
property rights under the common law. Rather it seeks a clue as to the donor's
intent. Without proof of different intent, it can not be assumed that such donors
intended to give their spouses such control over the donated asset that he or she
may alienate one half of it without the permission of the spouse who supplied the
sole consideration for the asset. Such an assumption ignores the unity of the

marital relationship."
59. See Jones v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 158 Misc. 466, 286 N. Y.
Supp. 4 (1936), for a partial review of the cases.

